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Reasons for Citizenship-Based Taxation?
Montano Cabezas*
ABSTRACT

The United States is alone in its practice of taxing the worldwide
income of not only U.S. residents, but also U.S. citizens. Such a
practice, at least at first glance, presents serious equitable concerns for
Americans who live abroad. The author notes that the government last
discussed its reasons for using such a system in 1924, the year in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional validity of citizenshipbased taxation in Cook v. Tait. In justifying its decision, the Supreme
Court relied on the inherent benefits received by U.S. citizens and their
property from the U.S. government, regardless of where the citizens
made their home or where the citizens' property was located. Despite
the Supreme Court's finding, the appropriateness of using citizenship as
a jurisdiction to tax has been the subject of academic controversy. In
addition, there is strong evidence that American citizens living abroad
view citizenship-based taxation as unfair and unjustified. If citizenship
taxation is to continue, then it would be helpful if Congress or the
Executive Branch explained the reasons for its continued use to combat
the perception of unfairness.
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OVERVIEW OF CITIZENSHIP-BASED TAXATION

The United States is alone in its practice of citizenship-based
taxation When income tax was first introduced in the United States to
1. The United States reserves its right to tax all "United States persons," which
include U.S. citizens, regardless of where that citizen is resident. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)
(2012). Eritrea is sometimes cited as an example of another country that taxes based on
citizenship. But see Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Taxation of Citizens Abroad:
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REv. 117, 208-210 (2014) (showing
that the Eritrean diaspora tax is different, to the extent that its purpose is to fund political

destabilization in the Horn of Africa and it is enforced through illicit means such as
violence, fraud, and extortion. The Eritrean diaspora tax is also a flat, two percent levy
on nonresidents, in contrast with the U.S. system's progressive rates.).
The Philippines has also been cited as practicing citizenship-based taxation, see
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., ISSUES PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS TO

MODIFY THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION app. B 6 (Comm. Print 1995)
[hereinafter J. COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT], but it ceased to do so in 1997. Tax Reform
Act of 1997, Rep. Act No. 8424, § 23(C) (Dec. 11, 1997) (Phil.). Similarly, Mexico
experimented with citizenship-based taxation until 1981, when it concluded this practice.
J. COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, supra, at 1.
As an interesting counter-normative development, China appears to be

experimenting with a form of citizenship-based taxation. See Keith Bradsher, China
Wants Taxes Paid by Citizens Living Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/international/china-starts-enforcing-tax-
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raise revenue for the Civil War, the government imposed a higher rate of
tax on the U.S.-source income of nonresident Americans. In imposing
this higher rate, Congress reasoned that because American citizens
abroad were shirking their duties to the United States while it was at war,
these citizens should compensate for their lack of civic engagement by
paying a higher rate of tax on their U.S.-source income. When true
citizenship-based taxation (that is, a regime that taxes a nonresident
citizen's worldwide income) was introduced in subsequent tax
legislation, the government put forward a rationale based on a citizen's
duties to the state and notions of community membership.3
Although ancillary issues concerning citizenship-based taxation
were debated after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913,4 which
was the first "modem" or post-Sixteenth Amendment5 tax legislation, the
U.S. government was silent on the main issue of why the United States
should be practicing citizenship-based taxation. This silence continued

law-for-citizens-working-abroad.html. If China were in fact successful at adopting a
citizenship-based tax regime, it would change the conversation from citizenship-based
taxation being a counter-normative anomaly, to something more along the lines of
citizenship-based taxation being a privilege of superpower countries (and perhaps also an
indicator of those countries' hubris). Professor Allison Christians, however, says that the
New York Times report on China's adoption of citizenship-based taxation was false, and
that the United States remains unique in its practice of taxing the worldwide income of
nonresident individual citizens. Allison Christians, UPDATE: China Does NOT Follow
US lead, Taxing its Global Diaspora. (If they did, it would be a terrible idea), TAX,
SOCIETY & CULTURE (Jan. 8,2015, 12:14 PM), http://taxpol.blogspot.ca/2015/01/china-tofollow-us-lead-taxing-its.html.
2. See infra Part II, note 36 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II, note 45 and accompanying text.
4. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166.
5. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution allowed Congress greater
flexibility in its taxing power. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."). Prior to its adoption in 1913, other Constitutional provisions required
that Congress apportion direct taxes according to population, see U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2,
cl. 3; that Congress ensure that any duties and excise taxes were "uniform throughout the
United States," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; that Congress guide the apportionment of taxes
according to population with the Constitutionally required census, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, § 2,
cl. 3; and that Congress not impose state-based export taxes or duties, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
The motivation for adopting the Sixteenth Amendment was the Supreme Court's
decision in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on
rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Pollock decision reasoned that an income tax on
property-including interest, rents, and dividends-was a direct tax and thus must be
apportioned according to population as indicated in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.
Pollock, 158 U.S. at 621. The result was that Pollock invalidated general taxing statutes
because they failed the apportionment requirement (for example, the Revenue Act of
1894, ch. 349, §73, 28 Stat. 509, 553, 556 (1985), which imposed a two percent tax on
income over $4,000), and had the practical effect of restricting any future federal income
taxation to salaries, gifts, inheritances, and corporate profits. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 637.
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for the almost 90 years between 1924, when the Supreme Court found
citizenship-based taxation to be constitutional based on an inherentbenefits-received rationale,6 and 2010, when the U.S. government
enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA") for the
purposes of enforcing tax compliance by U.S. taxpayers, both resident
and nonresident, who use foreign bank accounts.8 The primary objective
of FATCA is to stop tax evasion by U.S. residents who use foreign bank
accounts to hide money; the legislation requires foreign banks to share
information about any person with indicia of U.S. tax status.9 An
important secondary effect of FATCA, however, is that the U.S. capacity
to administer citizenship-based taxation is greatly increased, which
makes it an opportune moment for the United States to revisit its reasons
for taxing those who have no economic connection to the country except

-

6.
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) ("[T]he government, by its very nature,
benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore has the power to make
the benefit complete. Or to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not
and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or
out of the United States, and was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of
the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the
United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen.").
7. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501502 (2010), 124 Stat. 71, 97-109. FATCA functions by imposing new reporting
requirements on foreign financial institutions (broadly defined, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1471
5(d) (as amended in 2014)) that serve U.S. persons. These reporting requirements are
enforced by 30 percent withholding of any U.S.-sourced payment to the foreign financial
institution. I.R.C. § 1471 (2012).
8. To arrive at this statement, I surveyed all relevant government documents
created between 1789 and 2015 using ProQuest Congressional and ProQuest Legislative
Insight databases. The documents I consulted included the Congressional Record, the
Congressional Globe, the Annals of Congress, House and Senate Journals, House and
Senate documents, House and Senate Reports, Executive Branch Documents, and
published and unpublished hearings. I additionally consulted statements and publications
issued by the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the
House Committee on Ways and Means.
9. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501.
By "foreign banks," I mean "foreign financial institutions" as defined by Treas. Reg. §
1.1471-5(d). For background information on the events that led to the enactment of
FATCA, see Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign: Advice for the
Second Obama Administration,40 PEPP. L. REv. 1373, 1373-74, 1382 (2013) ("FATCA
arose directly in response to publicity surrounding well known and venerable foreign
institutions, most especially in Switzerland, that have helped U.S. customers hide income
and assets from the IRS."). The most famous actor in this controversy was the Swiss
bank UBS AG, which, after Bradley Birkenfeld, one of UBS's bankers, informed the
U.S. Department of Justice of the Swiss bank's tax evasion practices, was forced to pay
$780 million in fines. UBS to Pay $780 Million to Settle Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 2009, 4:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/ubsreaches-deal-over-offshore-banking-services/.
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for their citizenship status.10 But, despite being an appropriate time for
examining this issue, the U.S. government has restricted its statements to
discussions of how FATCA will deter offshore tax evasion and "tax
cheats," and has so far failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
discuss the larger concept of citizenship-based taxation."1
In America, the fact that the United States assesses a worldwide tax
based on an individual's citizenship is not a topic of everyday
conversation.12
Among those U.S. residents who are aware of
citizenship-based taxation, most are unaware of the problems associated
with this unique practice and are thus unable to empathize with those
who are disproportionately affected by its burdens. In particular, it is the
invisible nature of this system's imposition of tax on a nonresident
citizen's worldwide income, and the fact that individuals lack recourse
against such imposition, that makes its use, at least on first impression,
controversial. Those burdened by it-namely, American citizens living
abroad-have no dedicated .representative in Congress,13 and their
10. It is important to remember how difficult it is to administer a citizenship-based
tax regime without mandatory global reporting. There is no mechanism by which the
United States tracks the location of its citizens. Similarly, unless U.S.-citizen taxpayers
either work for a U.S. corporate subsidiary or have previously complied with their
foreign reporting and filing obligations, the IRS has no real way of knowing who is
compliant and who is not. Thus, although not enacted for reasons related to citizenshipbased taxation, the effect of FATCA's worldwide reporting is to make, for the first time,
the effective administration of citizenship-based taxation a reality. Note, however, that
there are concerns about the capacity of the IRS to enforce citizenship-based taxation,
even with the increased information offered by FATCA. See NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 143 (2008).

11. FATCA's central goal is "rooting out individuals hiding their money in bank
secrecy jurisdictions[.]" Douglas Shulman, Prepared Remarks of Commissioner Douglas
Shulman before the 22nd Annual George Washington University International Tax
Conference (Dec. 10, 2012). For a typical statement from an elected representative
concerning FATCA, see the remarks of Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) quoted in The
New York Times. See David Jolly, For Americans Abroad, Taxes Just Got More
Complicated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/
global/for-americans-abroad-taxes-just-got-more-complicated.html
("Offshore
tax
evasion costs the U.S. jobs and billions of dollars each year, and it puts an unfair burden
on the average American taxpayer to make up the difference. .. . In an era when budgets
are tight, it's critical for the I.R.S. to have the resources it needs to root out tax cheats.").
12. Those with Green Card status, formally termed "lawful permanent residents,"
are deemed to be residents of the United States and are thus also subject to tax on their
worldwide income regardless of whether or not they actually live in the U.S. See I.R.C.
§§ 7701(b)(1)(A), 7701(b)(6) (2012).
13. See generally Nancy Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV.
555 (2002). Also, note that even residents of U.S. territories have nominal representation
in Congress, despite the fact that some of those residents, such as those of American
Samoa, are not U.S. citizens but rather U.S. nationals. In contrast, note that the residents
of Washington, D.C., like citizens abroad, have no voting Congressional representation
(although they do have three electoral college votes for presidential elections). Since
November 2000, the District of Columbia has used the slogan "Taxation Without
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physical absence from the United States makes them ill-positioned to
mount a public-relations campaign against the practice. 14 Thus, in effect,
citizenship-based taxation is a system that disproportionately affects a
vulnerable minority.
A rebuttal to this assertion would be that only those who choose to
leave the United States are affected by citizenship-based taxation.
Therefore, because the practice exclusively affects a self-selecting group,
many of the nefarious characteristics associated with minority
discrimination are removed. However, classifying those affected by
citizenship-based taxation as self-selecting negates the reality of children
who are born in America and receive citizenship as a birthright, even if
they leave at a very young age (often termed "accidental Americans");"
children of Americans who are born abroad and obtain citizenship by
lineage; 16 and the general, globalized nature of today's world, which
often requires people to leave the United States for personal, education,
or employment reasons. 17 Further, to the extent that those supporting
citizenship-based taxation do so on the premise that nonresident
Representation" on its motor vehicle license plates. Chan Sewell, Message Gets Rolling;
D.C. Government Enlists Residents' Vehicles In Campaign for Congressional
Representation, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at C.01. For more on the lack of dedicated
Congressional representation for U.S. citizens living abroad, see infra note 81, and the
accompanying text.
14. A rebuttal to the argument that those who live abroad have no capacity to mount
a public relations campaign would be the presence of American Citizens Abroad and
other similar expatriate lobbying groups. But while recognizing that small pockets of
expatriates form communities and are thus able to combine their resources, the expatriate
community is generally diffuse and is thus at a structural disadvantage. One could,
however, argue that the internet is an equalizer in terms of facilitating association and
would remove most, if not all, barriers that would prevent an expatriate from engaging
with support and advocacy groups such as American Citizens Abroad.
15. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bestows citizenship on
anyone born in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1, cl. 1 ("All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside."). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)
(2012) (listing those who are nationals and citizens of the United States at birth). The
result of this policy is that a person who is born in the United States, but then leaves
permanently at a very young age, is nonetheless considered a citizen and is thus subject to
worldwide taxation on all sources of income. Boris Johnson is among the most famous
examples of those affected. See, e.g., David A. Graham, London Mayor Boris Johnson
Hates the IRS, Too, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international
/archive/2015/02/boris-Johnson-renounces-us-citizenship-tax-bill-mayor-london/385554/.
16. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(c)-(e), (g) (2012).
17. For examples of Americans moving abroad for employment, see Emilie Yam,
Young Americans Going Abroad to Teach, CNN
(Mar. 20,
2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/03/20/teaching.abroad/index.html.
For a statistic
showing that the amount of Americans studying abroad has tripled in the past twenty
years, see Press Release, Institute of International Education, Open Doors 2013:
International Students in the United States and Study Abroad by American Students are
at All-Time High (Nov. 11, 2013).
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Americans who do not wish to be taxed by the United States while
abroad may simply relinquish their citizenship, such proponents of
citizenship-based taxation have grossly underestimated the breadth of the
relinquishment process. In addition to the financial,' 8 administrative, and
emotional burdens associated with relinquishing citizenship, one must
also have a new citizenship available post-relinquishment to avoid the
specter of being stateless.19 The combined effect of these disadvantages
means that citizenship becomes a quasi-immutable characteristic, which
makes any discrimination on this ground all the more suspect.
Despite the lack of popular debate about, and awareness of,
citizenship-based taxation, which is likely due to the fact that those
affected by it have a reduced visibility and presence within the United
States, many academic commentators have produced in-depth analyses
of the substantive issues associated with the topic. Professor Reuven
Avi-Yonah has argued that citizenship-based taxation is an outdated
mode of assessment and has no place in today's globalized society.20
Professor Ruth Mason has provided thoughtful and meticulous rebuttals
21
to the arguments in favor of citizenship-based taxation.
Professor
Daniel Shaviro has proposed a method for making citizenship-based
taxation fairer,2 2 and Professor Edward Zelinsky has argued that
citizenship-based taxation is simply a proxy for assessing taxes based on
an individual's domicile.23
Finally, Professor Michael Kirsch
acknowledges the problems associated with the current administration of
citizenship-based taxation, but argued first that due to the benefits that
18. For more on the financial burdens involved with relinquishing citizenship, see
I.R.C. § 877 (2012) (treating relinquishment of citizenship or green-card status as a
realization event for tax purposes for those who exceed income or wealth thresholds).
With respect to administrative fees, the State Department announced its intention to
increase the fee for renunciation of U.S. citizenship by 422% from $450 to $2,350 in
2014. Schedule of Fees for Consular Services, Department of State and Overseas
Embassies and Consulate-Visa and Citizenship Services Fee Charges, 79 Fed. Reg.
51,247, 51,251 (Aug. 28, 2014) (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 22.1).
19. Although the U.S. is one of the few countries that will allow relinquishment of
citizenship even if the person relinquishing does not hold citizenship in another country,
State Department guidelines require its employees to convey the difficulties that such a
person would face, including the loss of consular assistance and greatly reduced ability to
travel. Statelessness Resulting from Loss of Nationality, 7 U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign
Affairs Manual § 1215 (2008). Accordingly, unless a person intends to become stateless
as a form of political protest, the consequences of doing so are great enough to make it a
practically impossible option.
20. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAx NOTES INT'L
389 (2010).
21. See generally Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. (2016).
22. See generally Daniel Shaviro, Taxing PotentialCommunity Members' Foreign
Source Income, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-09.
23. Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an
AdministrableProxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1289, 1291 (2011).
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citizens receive, and, more recently, because citizenship serves as an
important indicator of a person's membership in a community,
citizenship-based taxation can accordingly be a rational, fair way to
assess an individual.2 4
In addition to the substantive issues discussed by academic
commentators, there are important administrative and enforcement issues
that greatly influence how citizenship-based taxation is experienced by
nonresident Americans.
Most important among these are the
unreasonably high compliance costs imposed by the U.S. citizenshipbased taxation regime. In Canada-which is a good comparator to the
United States because the countries share a language, have similar
financial accounting and fiscal principles, 25 and because Canadian
financial professionals are generally familiar with any differences
between the U.S. and Canadian systemS26-estimates for accounting
costs to file a basic offshore income tax return, even when one does not

24. See generally Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.
Y. U. L. REv. 443, 470-79 (2007) (discussing the "benefits theory" of citizenship-based
taxation); Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note
1, at 126-27. It is worth noting that Professor Kirsch's Taxing Citizens in a Global
Economy provides a thorough history of citizenship-based taxation, which is so
comprehensive that some tax historians cite it as a quasi-primary source. See, e.g.,
Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: Why We Tax Everyone on Everything, TAx ANALYSTS
TAX HISTORY PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2014), http://taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsflArtWeb
/3AF72D29CABEB75085257D 1B0041 C874.
25. For support of the statement that the United States and Canada share similar
accounting principles, see, e.g., Eli Amir, Trevor S. Harris & Elizabeth K. Venuti, A
Comparison ofthe Value-Relevance of US. versus Non-US. GAAPAccounting Measures
Using Form 20-F Reconciliations, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 230, 233 (1993) (noting that
Canadian companies were excluded from the article's survey due to similarities between
accounting systems). See also the "wraparound" SEC Forms F-7, F-8, and F-80, which
permit Canadian companies to avoid the U.S. GAAP reconciliation exercise that would
otherwise be required by Form 20-F. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.37 (2016) (Form F-7); 17
C.F.R. § 239.38 (2016) (Form F-8); 17 C.F.R. § 239.41 (2016) (Form F-80). But see
SEC Form F-10, which does not offer Canadian companies an exemption from U.S.
GAAP reconciliation. 17 C.F.R. § 239.40 (2016) (Form F-10).
For the assertion that Canadian and U.S. fiscal principles are similar, this
proposition rests on the generally accepted notion within the tax community that the two
systems share substantive commonalities. For example, Professor Stafford Smiley, in his
Comparative Income Tax Law class at the Georgetown University Law Center noted that,
despite some differences, the two systems, in practice, were "basically the same."
Stafford Smiley, Professor of Law, Geo. U. L. Ctr., Class Lecture (Jan. 22, 2016).
26. For example, Robert Raizenne, a beloved adjunct tax professor at the McGill
University Faculty of Law and a prominent member of the Canadian tax bar, tells his
international tax students that every Canadian practitioner must know at least some U.S.
tax principles. Similarly, every Canadian accountant who is employed at a Big Four firm
with whom I have spoken has shown a knowledge of the differences between U.S. and
Canadian GAAP and IFRS.
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owe any tax to the United States, easily reach the thousands of dollars.2 7
This disadvantage is compounded when one considers that those taking
advantage of state-sponsored savings programs (e.g., the foreign
equivalents of IRAs, Roth IRAs, and Coverdell Education Savings
Accounts) are deemed to have foreign trusts that trigger the passive
foreign investment company ("PFIC") rules in the Internal Revenue
Code and their corresponding filing obligations.2 8 Similarly, any
investment in non-U.S. mutual funds by U.S. citizens living abroad will
generally trigger the PFIC regime, even if the mutual fund is located in
the jurisdiction where the taxpayer is actually living. 29 By the IRS's own
estimate, the relevant forms for such PFICs take over 40 hours to
complete.30
Additionally, the IRS itself has noted the failure of the United States
to properly inform its citizens abroad of their tax obligations.3 ' These

27. See, e.g., John Richardson, Ruth, Video Testimony Preparedfor Submission to
Senate Finance Committee International Tax
Working Group (2015),
https://vimeopro.com/citizenshiptaxation/video-testimonials. The full submission to the
Senate Finance Committee International Tax Working Group by John Richardson, which
includes the previously cited video testimony, is available at http://www.finance.senate
.gov/legislation/details/?id=34184f67-5056-a032-52c8-0a4960018d92.
28. I.R.C. §§ 1291-97 (2012). The United States and Canada, however, have
solved the problem of having some state-sponsored savings programs being deemed
foreign trusts. See Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art.
XVIII(7) Sept. 26, 1980, Can.-U.S., 1980 U.S.T. 93; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM
8891 (2012). This exemption is only available for registered retirement savings plans
(RRSPs) and registered retirement income funds (RRIFs). Other Canadian governmentsponsored savings plans, such as tax free savings accounts (TFSA), registered education
savings plans (RESP), and registered disability savings plans (RDSP) are still deemed
PFICs under I.R.C. § 1297 (2012). Note that U.S. government-sponsored savings
programs, such as Roth IRAs, are not always restricted to U.S. residents, see, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 408 (2012), but in practice, one generally needs to be a U.S. resident, or have a
preexisting relationship with a foreign bank that has a U.S. branch, before a bank will
open such an account. Although there is anecdotal evidence of some nonresident U.S.
citizens gaining access to government-sponsored savings programs, my argument here is
not that it is impossible to do so, but rather that a benefit that is not easily accessible and
requires uncertain practices, say, listing the address of a U.S.-resident family member on
the relevant bank forms, is not really a benefit at all.
29. I.R.C. § 1291 (2012).
30. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8621 13 (2014).
31.
TIFFANIE N. REKER, DAVID C. CICO & SAIMA S. MEHMOOD, 2012 TAXPAYER
EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUALS LIVING ABROAD: SERVICES AwARENESS, USE, PREFERENCES,
AND FILING BEHAVIORS 1, 24 (showing that citizens abroad were often unaware of their

FBAR and FATCA obligations due to the IRS ceasing to send information by post).
Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, affirms the IRS's dwindling capacity to
inform citizens abroad of their U.S. taxation obligations, and expresses regret that all of
the IRS's foreign individual offices are scheduled to close. Breakfast Conference: The
Role of the National Taxpayer Advocate Service in Protecting Taxpayer Rights and
Ensuring a Fair and Just Tax System, CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION (July 2, 2015),

http://www.ctf.ca/CTFWEB/EN/ConferencesEvents/2015/Recordings/15PD-
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administrative shortcomings take on new urgency when one considers
the disproportionately high penalties for non-compliance (mere nonfiling can result in large penalties even when no tax is owning) 32 and the
increasing capacity of the United States to enforce citizenship-based
taxation due to the enactment of FATCA. Although Professor Kirsch,
who argues that administration and enforcement issues must not be
conflated with the substantive merits of citizenship being indicative of
community membership and thus amenable to taxation, 3 3 is correct in
principle, the often offensive results stemming from the administration of
citizenship-based taxation cannot be ignored when assessing the fairness
of the regime.
In the preceding paragraphs, my aim has been to contextualize my
thesis by giving a brief overview of citizenship-based taxation and the
most prominent academic discussions of this topic in order to provide
readers with necessary background information before proceeding to
Parts II and III of this article. In the next part, I will provide an analysis
of the reasons given by the U.S. government for enacting citizenshipbased taxation, and, where such reasons are lacking, I will comment on
possible causes for these omissions, as well as on the problems that result
from such silence.
II.

A MODERN RATIONALE FOR CITIZENSHIP-BASED TAXATION?

A.

Reasonsfor Citizenship-BasedTaxation
1.

Civil War Tax Acts

The rationale for enacting an income tax that obtained its
jurisdiction to tax through citizenship was, generally speaking, based on
the idea that a citizens had a duty to contribute to their countryespecially when that country was at war and its existence as a Union was
threatened.
As discussed in Part I, the first federal income tax
legislation, enacted in 1861 and 1862, was spurred by the outbreak of the

MTLVideo.aspx/.

See also Kat Lucero, IRS Closures Worry Overseas Taxpayers, 77

TAX NOTEs INT'L 389 (Feb. 2, 2015).
32. For FATCA-related penalties, see I.R.C. §§ 6038D(d)(1)-(2) (2012) (nonreporting penalty of $10,000 to $50,000 for failure to report covered assets and accounts).

For FBAR-related penalties, see 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B) (2012) and 31 C.F.R. §
1010.350 (2016) (penalty of $10,000 for each non-willful FBAR violation); 31 U.S.C. §
5321(a)(5)(C) (2012) (willful violation penalty of the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent
of the balance in the account for each undisclosed year for up to six years).
33. American Citizens Abroad Global Foundation, 21st Century Taxation of
Americans Abroad: Citizenship-basedTaxation vs. Residence-based Taxation, YoUTUBE

(May 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-RMiAMc4NLxA.
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Civil War. 34 These statutes taxed nonresident citizens on U.S.-source
income only, which, based on a first impression, would suggest a
territorial system of taxation, instead of a worldwide one. But the flavor
of citizenship-based taxation as we know it today-that is, the taxation of
nonresidents on their worldwide income-was present. The Civil War
tax acts effectively penalized nonresidents by taxing U.S.-source income
at a higher rate and denying nonresident citizens the base exemption
amount that was offered to resident citizens.3 5 The purpose of imposing
a higher rate on nonresident citizens, as described by Senator Jacob
Collamer, was to ensure that the nonresident did not earn income from
U.S. sources, such as public debt or real property, and then go "skulking
away from contributing his personal support to the Government in this
day of its extremity."
Citizenship-based taxation of nonresidents' worldwide income
began in 1864.37 In contrast with the earlier 1861 and 1862 legislation,
however, nonresidents were now assessed at the same rates as
residents.
In other words, the tax system had moved from penalizing
the U.S.-sourced income of nonresident citizens, by assessing that
income at a higher marginal rate and denying income exemptions, to
taxing all sources of a citizen's income, regardless of residence, at the
same marginal rates. The rationale for moving to the worldwide taxation
of a nonresident citizen's income, as opposed to a punitive level of tax on
a nonresident's U.S.-source income, as seen in the 1861 and 1862
legislation, is not clear. The Congressional Globe records Senator
34. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, repealedby Act of July
1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432,
473 (repealed 1865).
35. One could argue that taxing U.S.-source income at a higher rate could not only
approximate the tax that would otherwise be collected on a taxpayer's worldwide income,
but would also be much easier to administer and enforce. Further, such a method of
taxation would arguably be more just, as there is a greater rational connection between a
citizen's U.S.-source income and that citizen's duty owed to the United States, the
citizen's substantive membership to the U.S. community, and any benefits that the citizen
would receive from the state, as compared to the connection between the citizen's nonU.S.-source income and any duty owed to, membership in, or benefits received from U.S.
society.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2661 (1864) (statement of Sen. Collamer)
(discussing the Act of July 1, 1862). A contextual reading of Senator Collamer's
statement will reveal a characterization of nonresident Americans as wealthy pleasureseekers living abroad in exotic locales. See id. (American citizens should not "go out of
the country, reside in Paris or elsewhere, avoiding the risk of being drafted or
contributing anything personally to the requirements of the country at this time, and get
off with as low a tax as anybody else.").
37. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281, amended by Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479.
38. Id. (providing for tax collection until December 31, 1866); Act of Mar. 2, 1867,
ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478 (providing for tax collection until December 31, 1868).
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Collamer stating that he did "not know exactly upon what ground"
Congress was basing its reasons for proposing the worldwide taxation of
nonresident citizens.39 Professor Kirsch, however, notes that worldwide
taxation at a lower rate could raise more revenue than U.S.-source-based
taxation at a higher rate, and further posits that the move toward
citizenship-based taxation could be linked to the era's growing emphasis
and focus on the importance of federal citizenship.40
All subsequent versions of Civil War-era income tax legislation
included citizenship-based taxation. 4 1 Similarly, the 1894 Tax Act, 42
which the Supreme Court would ultimately find unconstitutional for its
lack of apportionment of benefits among the states in Pollock v.
Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,43 taxed nonresident citizens on a worldwide
basis. Like the duty-based rationale for taxing nonresidents expressed
during the Civil War by Senator Collamer,44 legislators such as Senator
George Hoar characterized those living abroad as shirking their
obligations as citizens to support their communities, and reasoned that
such an avoidance of community obligations justified taxing
nonresidents on their worldwide income. 4 5 Post-Sixteenth Amendment,
the modem-day federal income tax system was introduced with the
Revenue Act of 1913,46 which maintained citizenship-based taxation on
all sources of income, regardless of the citizen's residence.4 7 The U.S.
government has maintained this form of citizenship-based taxation in
every subsequent federal tax statute.48
Until 1924, when Cook v. Tait4 9 was decided, the duty-based
rationale of Senator Collamer and the similar community-membership
reasoning of Senator Hoar were the only government-offered
explanations of why the United States ought to tax nonresident citizens
39. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2661 (1864).
40. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 24, at 452 n.28; id. at
452 n.29 and accompanying text.
41. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479; Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch.
169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478; Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
42. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
43. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
44. See the discussion of Senator Collamer, supra note 36.
45. See 26 CONG. REc. 6, 632-33 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("There are a
great many people, I am sorry to say, who go abroad for that very purpose [of avoiding
tax], and some of them went abroad during the late [Civil W]ar. They lived in luxury, at
the same time at less cost, in a foreign capital; they had none of the voluntary obligations
which rest upon citizens, of charity, or contributions, or supporting churches, or anything
of that sort, and they escaped taxation.").
46. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
47. Id.
48. For a list of all relevant statutes and provisions, see Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a
GlobalEconomy, supra note 24, at 454 n.41.
49. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 47 (1924).
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in a way that was essentially punitive, especially when compared to
citizens of most other countries, which did not tax in such a manner. In
the midst of the Civil War, Senator Collamer's frustrations seem
reasonable: who, after all, would want those who could either fight or
financially support a war effort to leave when the state was in need?
More interesting are Senator Hoar's justifications for a citizenship-based
tax, which go further in the sense that they include ideas of community
membership by referring to the "voluntary obligations which rest upon
citizens, of charity, or contributions, or supporting churches, or anything
of that sort."so This community membership theory is currently the
leading justification used by academic commentators to explain why it
would not be inequitable for the United States to continue to practice
citizenship-based taxation.5 1
2.

Post-Civil War and Cook v. Tait

In the post-Civil War era, the rationales previously given by the
government seemed outdated and citizenship-based taxation soon came
under scrutiny. In 1918, to counter the problems of citizenship-based
taxation, the foreign tax credit was introduced,5 2 not only for reasons of
fairness (i.e., to eliminate double taxation), but also due to concerns
about competitive disadvantages faced by American corporations
operating abroad, which were aired before Congress 54 and the House
Committee on Ways and Means.
In 1921, the Departments of
Commerce, State, and Treasury rallied to exempt foreign income of
corporations that derived 80 percent of their income from foreign
sources, but the proposed legislation was ultimately defeated in the

50. See 26 CONG. REc. 6, 632-33 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
51. See, e.g., Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 1,
at 126-27; see generally Shaviro, Taxing Potential Community Members' Foreign
Source Income, supra note 22. See also Mason, Citizenship Taxation, supra note 21, at
197-211 (discussing the community rationale).
52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073 (1919) (repealed
1921); see Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The 'OriginalIntent' of US.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1045 (1996) (stating that "[i]n 1918,
however, with the world at war and tax rates inflating rapidly around the globe,
international double taxation was becoming a far more serious burden on Americans
doing business or investing abroad. The top marginal rates on individuals in the United
States reached seventy-seven percent, and although the basic corporate rate was only ten
percent, an excess profits tax at rates from eight to sixty percent also applied to many
large companies. In such circumstances, additional layers of taxation from other nations
were potentially confiscatory. Relief became a matter of some urgency.").
53. 56 CONG. REc. at 677-78 (1918) (statement of Rep. Kitchin).
54. Id.
55. Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Revenue Act
of 1918, 65th Cong., 2nd Session 648 (1918).
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Senate.16 This shift from the government discussing citizenship-based
taxation itself, as exemplified through the reasons offered by Senators
Hoar and Collamer, to addressing discrete problems raised by
citizenship-based taxation, was a preview of what would become the
government's standard operating procedure regarding the issue.
The decision of George Cook to contest the U.S. taxation of his
foreign source income in 1922, however, momentarily stopped the
government's trend of focusing on the ancillary issues raised by
citizenship-based taxation, and ultimately forced the Supreme Court to
affirm the validity of the practice and justify its existence in the 1924
Cook v. Tait decision. Mr. Cook had moved from the United States to
Mexico almost 20 years prior to his contestation of the United States'
right to tax him based merely on the fact that he was an American
citizen. Mr. Cook was domiciled in Mexico City, and the income on
which the United States was assessing tax was entirely sourced in
Mexico.58 Feeling that the assessment was unjust, Mr. Cook contested
the constitutionality of citizenship-based taxation. He argued that it
violated Article I, sections eight and nine, of the U.S. Constitution, and
additionally argued that citizenship-based taxation was a taking of his
property in breach of the Fifth Amendment.
Despite the lack of an obvious connection to the United States
except for Mr. Cook's citizenship, the Supreme Court found not only that
the federal government had the capacity to enforce citizenship-based
taxation because it did not violate the Constitution, but also that the
rationale for taxing the worldwide income of nonresidents was that
"government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property
wherever found."60 The Court further noted that it was wrong to equate
the United States' sovereign power with the country's "relations to its
citizens and their relation to it." 6 1 In other words, the fact that the United
States would lack jurisdiction to enforce laws was of no consequence to
the constitutionality of citizenship-based taxation. Situs, source, and
domicile were accordingly not determinative, and a person's status as a
U.S. citizen for tax purposes, due to the benefits that the citizen receives

56. 61 CONG. REC. 7023, 7026 (1921). Later that year, however, Congress would
allow for the exemption of corporate income earned in a U.S. citizen's possession, but
not remitted to the United States, which arguably is the beginning of the exclusion for
corporate income that is held offshore.
57. Transcript of Record at 1-2, Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (No. 220).
58. Id. at 5, 9.
59. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (No. 220).
60. Cook, 265 U.S. at 56.
61. Id.
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from the government, was sufficient to impose tax on that citizen's
worldwide income.62
Move from Reasons to Patches

B.

One of the most interesting aspects of the post-Cook v. Tait
discourse is that the conversation resumes the trend started after the Civil
War whereby the government moved away from discussing citizenship
taxation itself, and instead concentrated on finding solutions or "patches"
to the discrete equitable and commercial problems that arose from taxing
nonresident citizens on their worldwide income. Although it is true that
in 1918, prior to the Cook v. Tait decision, American entrepreneurs were
already informing legislators of the potential commercial disadvantages
to American exports due to citizenship-based taxation, there is a marked
change in the tenor and subject matter of legislative debate after Cook v.
Tait was decided. As best set out in Professor Kirsch's Taxing Citizens
in a Global Economy, the debate and subsequent legislation were
altered63 to focus on the foreign earned income exclusion, first
introduced in 1926, and proposals for its expansion and abolishment.64
The foreign earned income exclusion, as it appears today, excludes
approximately the first $100,000 of income from an individual's
assessment.6 5 Together with the foreign tax credit, it is one of the two
main patches that combat the inequitable effects of citizenship-based
taxation. The problems with both of these solutions, however, are many.
Concerning the foreign earned income exclusion, the first "patch" to
alleviate the equitable problems associated with citizenship-based
taxation, one of the most obvious problems is that only certain wage
income is excluded.6 6 Although likely designed as a way to ensure that

62.
63.

Id.
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 213(b)(14), 44 Stat. 9 (1926).

64.

Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a GlobalEconomy, supranote 24, at 457-460.

65. See I.R.C. § 911 (2012). The amount for 2016 is $101,300. Rev. Proc. 201553. The excluded amount is also indexed for inflation. I.R.C. § 911(b)(2)(D) (2012).
Note that, if any income remains taxable after using the foreign eared income exclusion,
such income will be taxable at the marginal rates that would otherwise have been

applicable but for the foreign earned income exclusion.

I.R.C. § 911(f) (2012). For

example, if a person had earned $200,000 in foreign earned income in 2016, the amount

above $101,300 would be taxed at the marginal rates applicable to $101,301-$200,000,
as opposed to the rates applicable to $0-$101,300. Any income exempted by the foreign
earned income exclusion is ineligible for a foreign tax credit.

66.

For more on the problems associated with the foreign earned income exclusion,

see generally Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. Stern, Innocents Abroad? The 1978
Foreign EarnedIncome Act and the Casefor Its Repeal, 65 VA. L. REv. 1093 (1979) and
Rende Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity,
38 VAND. L. REv. 101 (1985). See also Brainard L. Patton, Jr., United States Individual
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passive income from offshore investment

was not excluded, the

provision establishes no exclusion for active profits from one's business.
On the one hand, proprietors of small businesses could easily plan
around this hurdle by paying themselves a wage.67 But on the other
hand, and perhaps more importantly, independent contractors would
receive no exemption for the income derived from the services that they
provided. This is particularly important when one considers the current,
prevalent practice of using independent contractors for what are arguably
employee positions.6 8

Consider the following example:

two U.S.

citizens reside abroad and work as truck drivers for courier companies.
One citizen works as an independent contractor, the other, as an
employee. In this case, the employee truck driver will benefit from the
foreign earned income exclusion, while the independent contractor will
not. While leaving aside the issue of whether or not their situations
would be equalized through the use of the foreign tax credit, we see here
a clear case of horizontal inequity, where two similarly situated persons
are treated differently due to nominal distinctions.
With respect to the foreign tax credit, the second "patch," the
principal issue is that it is applicable only to income taxes as defined by
the Internal Revenue Code and that statute's associated regulations.69
This raises a horizontal equity issue similar to the one discussed in regard
to the foreign earned income exclusion; namely, that of similarly situated
Income Tax Policy as It Applies to Americans Resident Overseas, 1975 DUKE L.J. 691,

706-12 (1975).
67. Note however that such a strategy could put one at a tax disadvantage in the
non-U.S. country where the small business operates. Canada, for example, has rules that
provide advantageous tax rates for small businesses. If the business was not either
making (or losing) enough money to take advantage of both the U.S. foreign earned
income exemption and the advantageous rates offered by Canada, the business and its
owner would be at a disadvantage when compared to similarly situated Canadian
businesses and owners.
68. This aggressive avoidance technique, which often borders on evasion, has
become so well known that the U.S. revenue services are taking note and stepping up
their efforts to curb this practice. See, e.g., Elizabeth Milito, IRS Vows to Intensify
Enforcement of Employment Tax Evasion, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT

BUSINESSES (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.nfib.com/press-media/press-media-item?cmsid=
48723; Janet Novack, Independent ContractorEnforcement. There's More than the IRS
to Fear, FORBES (May 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2013/05/09
/independent-contractor-enforcement-theres-more-than-the-irs-to-fear/; Betty Wang, IRS
Cracking Down on "Independent Contractors", FIND LAW: FREE ENTERPRISE (July 31,

2013), http://blogs.findlaw.com/free-enterprise/2013/07/irs-cracking-down-on-independe
nt-contractors.html. There is, however, anecdotal evidence that this trend may be shifting
in some sectors, for reasons unrelated to litigation risk. See Biz Carson, There's One
Major Reason Startups are Switching Their Workers from Contractorsto Employees, and
it's not Lawsuits, BusINEss INSIDER, Aug. 4, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-

startups-switch-from-contractors-to-employees-2015-8.
69. I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg, § 1.901-2 (as amended in 2013) (limiting
the foreign tax credit to income, war profits, and excess profits taxes).
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persons being treated differently due to nominal distinctions, which
would arise when one country taxes income and another country taxes on
the basis of one or a combination of property, consumption, or excise.
For example, putting aside the applicability of the foreign earned income
exclusion, a U.S. citizen living abroad in a high-income-tax jurisdiction
could likely set off any U.S. income tax owed through the foreign tax
credit. Conversely, a similarly situated citizen living in a country that
raises revenue only through property and value-added taxes would not be
able to set off any income tax owing to the United States using the
foreign tax credit.
One could certainly argue that the two legislative "patches"
designed to alleviate the problems associated with citizenship-based
taxation, the foreign earned income exclusion and the foreign tax credit,
are meant to work in tandem. Therefore, singling out one of these
patches for scrutiny gives an inaccurate impression of how citizenshipbased taxation operates in practice.70 In other words, most of those who
live abroad will have the inequitable aspects of citizenship-based
taxation attenuated by one or both of the legislative patches, and the
instances of horizontal inequity are accordingly much rarer than the
impression given by my previous examples. But, although the legislative
patches would seem to limit the amounts actually owed under a
citizenship-based taxation regime, it is interesting that the debate about
how best to patch citizenship-based taxation was not eclipsed, or at least
accompanied by a concurrent conversation about why the United States
should tax nonresident citizens in the first place.
C.

The Lack of a CurrentRationale
1.

Problems with the Conversation

In retrospect, the shift away from debating the merits of citizenshipbased taxation is not unsurprising. The Supreme Court's decision in
Cook v. Tait affirmed the constitutional validity of citizenship-based
taxation. Accordingly, due to the difficulty of reversing a Supreme
Court precedent, future challenges to the system would have to be made
70. Note, however, that there have been several proposals to eliminate the foreign
earned income exclusion. See, e.g., Sens. Gregg & Wyden, EstimatedRevenue Effects of
S. 3018 (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Score.pdf;
Congressional Progressive Caucus, Back to Work Budget, http://cpc.grijalva.house.gov/
uploads/Back%20to%2OWork%2oBudget%20-%2OExecutive%2oSummary.pdf
see
generally NATIONAL COMMISSION OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM (2010),
https://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMom
entofTruthl2 l20l0.pdf. Singling out the foreign tax credit for analysis on its own is
therefore not inappropriate.
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in the political, instead of the legal, sphere." Once the debate became
political, however, the importance of lobbying increased, and along with
this shift came different strategies for effectuating change. A lobbyist
does not need systemic change in order to be successful. Rather,
lobbyists must only influence legislation to the degree necessary to give
their clients the desired result. Here, multinationals that exported
American goods and services sought to eliminate the U.S. taxation of
their American workers abroad.72 Because the foreign tax credit could
have uneven results depending on the jurisdiction in which a particular
worker was employed, the simplest solution was to lobby for an
exemption of the wage income earned by nonresident U.S. workers.
Once the multinationals obtained the result they sought, any other
equitable issues arising from citizenship-based taxation were dismissed
as irrelevant, and the focus of lobbyists turned to maintaining the gains
that they had already won.
In addition to changing the focus from legal to political solutions,
the rise of lobbying also created barriers to entry. Although there has
been much research by commentators on access to justice showing that
legal fees constitute a barrier to entry and can chill actions from those
with valid claims,73 there is also research showing that the costs of
lobbying are even higher than those of bringing a legal action.74 To add
further to the disparity between those who can lobby and those who
cannot, certain studies have shown that those who can afford the costs of
lobbying reap extraordinary returns on their expenditures.7 5
The rational reasons for the change in tenor with respect to the
conversation about citizenship-based taxation do not, however, change
the problematic result that, to this day, Congress has not offered any
reasons, or any discussion at all for that matter, for continuing its unique
and facially problematic exercise of citizenship-based taxation since

71. Consider that Congress had to amend the Constitution, by way of the Sixteenth
Amendment, in order to reverse the effect of Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 429 (1895). In addition, to date, the only tax-related decision that has been
reversed by the Supreme Court itself is Pollock, which had its holding on the immunity of
state bond interest from a nondiscriminatory federal tax overruled in South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). An interesting ancillary effect of the enduring nature of
legal precedent is that the cost of arguing for change becomes greater, which could
arguably create access to justice issues.
72. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 24, at 457-458.
73. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785
(2001).
74. See generally Raquel Alexander, Susan Scholz & Stephen Mazza, Measuring
Rates ofReturn for Lobbying Expenditures: An EmpiricalAnalysis Under the American
Jobs CreationAct, 25 J. L. & POLITICs 401 (2009).
75. Id.
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Cook v. Tait was decided.76 As the United States is no longer in a state
of civil war, the initial rationale for imposing citizenship-based taxation
is inapplicable.
Accordingly, the effective result of the U.S.
government's silence on the issue of citizenship-based taxation is an
affirmation of the inherent-benefits-received rationale put forward in
Cook v. Tait. The de facto reliance on this rationale is troubling because,
even in 1924 when the decision was issued, the benefits received by
citizens from the government were unclear.
2.
Return

On Inherent Benefits:

Non-representation and A Right of

Professor Kirsch, in Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, lists the
benefits that nonresidents could conceivably derive from the U.S.
government, including the protection of one's person and property, the
right of return, and the right to vote.77 In Citizenship Taxation, Professor
Mason offers convincing rebuttals to the soundness of characterizing the
foregoing occurrences as benefits--or, perhaps more accurately, of
characterizing such occurrences as benefits that justify the taxation of a
nonresident's worldwide income. In making her rebuttals, Professor
Mason often notes that other countries do not require worldwide taxation
in order for nonresidents to have the benefits named by Professor
Kirsch. 78 This comparative analysis is important to the extent that the
United States' practice of citizenship-based taxation is based on the
benefits provided by the state, as it recognizes other ways in which the
worldwide taxation of nonresidents' income makes the United States an
outlier. Two of these benefits in particular, voting rights and the right to
return, merit further discussion.
It is important to remember that U.S. citizens living abroad did not
have the right to vote until 1975-more than fifty years after Cook v. Tait
was decided on the inherent-benefits-received rationale and more than a
century after citizenship-based taxation was first implemented.79
Further, even once nonresident voting was established, administrative
inefficiencies mean that the ballots are sometimes not processed in time
to be counted.so Coupled with the lack of dedicated Congressional
76. For more on the methodology used to arrive at this claim, see the discussion
supra, note 8.
77. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a GlobalEconomy, supra note 24, at 470-78.
78. Mason, supra note 21, at 16-24.
79. Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142
(repealed 1986).
80. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-98-106, ELECTIONS: ACTION PLANS
NEEDED TO FULLY ADDRESS CHALLENGES IN ELECTRONIC ABSENTEE VOTING INITIATIVES
FOR MILITARY AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS 1 (2007) (noting that because the registration and
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representation for nonresident citizens,'81 these facts further establish the
narrative that citizenship-based taxation burdens a minority that does not
have a political voice. It is not surprising, then, that politicians do not
actively take up the concerns raised by nonresident citizens, as they have
no political incentive to do so. This assertion is even more true with
respect to those who are "lawfully admitted for permanent residence,"
more commonly known as Green Card holders, who are treated as U.S.
residents for tax purposes regardless of where they actually live. 82
Because Green Card holders cannot vote,83 they are even more removed
than nonresident citizens from American political life, and thus
politicians have even less incentive to consider the needs of nonresident
Green Card holders, who are nonetheless subject to U.S. taxation on their
worldwide income.
The right to return, and the corresponding right to participate in the
American economic and social community, is, in my opinion, the most
important benefit that a U.S. citizen (and a Green Card holder) derives
from that status.
The United States is a coveted destination for
immigrants, who recognize the social, political, and economic freedoms
that the country offers.84 For entrepreneurs, the United States holds a
special attraction due to its arguably unique comfort with failure, both
because of cultural attitudes and bankruptcy laws that allow a person to
"give it another try."85 Even if one does not recognize the country's
voting processes are normally done by mail, some votes do not arrive in time to be
counted).
81. By a lack of "dedicated Congressional representation," I mean that U.S. citizens
abroad lack a representative in Congress whose sole function is to present and advocate
for their needs and concerns. U.S. citizens who vote from abroad generally register with
the state in which they resided immediately prior to leaving the United States. Assuming
that citizens living abroad share similar needs and concerns, the fact that their voices are
not aggregated and directed toward one or more persons directly accountable to them in
Congress means that their effective representation will invariably be diluted.
Accordingly, because citizens living abroad are a minority in many jurisdictions instead
of being a majority in one, the issues important to them will take second place to the
issues raised by those who actually reside in the Congressional districts in which the
citizens living abroad vote.
82. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012).
83. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 316, 66 Stat. 477 (1952); 8
U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
84. See, e.g., OECD INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION DATABASE, https://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspxDataSetCode=MIG (last visited Sep. 5, 2015).
85. Telephone Interview with Richard Fortin, Chief Financial Officer, Link Energy
(Aug. 3, 2015). Richard Fortin, a former foreign-exchange officer with several
prominent Canadian banks, has over a decade of experience working in East and
Southeast Asia (stating during the interview that "[w]hile working in Asia, many of my
foreign colleagues had a fascination with the U.S.'s ability to tolerate, and even celebrate,
failure. In their home countries, if you failed, you were doomed to work at an entry-level
job for the rest of your life. But in the U.S., they had the impression that, if you have the
nerve to get up again, you can be reborn like a phoenix.").
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status in some or all of these areas as preeminent, it would be hard to
argue that the United States is not among a handful of nations where
immigrants from around the world aspire to live. Accordingly, even
though no other nation does this, it would conceivably not be
unreasonable for the United States to tax the worldwide income of all its
citizens, both resident and nonresidents, as a fee for the benefit of being a
member of its community, which may be exercised through the right to
return and work in the United States at any time.
And so if the reason that the United States continues to use
citizenship-based taxation is based on the benefits citizens receive from
the ability to participate in American society-that is, a right of returnit would be helpful if the U.S. government publicly stated this rationale.
One could argue that this characterization is only a slightly updated
version of the inherent-benefits-received theory set out in Cook v. Tait.
If that is true, then it follows that reaffirming those reasons may be
redundant. But I disagree with that premise. Let us assume that the
United States continues to justify citizenship-based taxation through
some kind of inherent-benefits-received rationale, as derived from Cook
v. Tait. First, the changing way in which citizens relate to the state in a
globalized society means that, unless updated, a rationale based on the
realities of 1924 would be largely inapplicable today. In addition, there
is academic controversy surrounding the appropriateness of citizenshipbased taxation, as well as strong evidence that American citizens living
abroad view citizenship-based taxation as unfair and unjustified. Thus,
in this particular circumstance, where there are both concerns of
unfairness and the group affected is vulnerable,87 it would be both
helpful and appropriate for the U.S. government to give reasons as to
why it still practices citizenship-based taxation.
3.

Commentary

The United States' practice of citizenship-based taxation seems, at
first glance, suspect. Although other countries have tried, no other state
has successfully employed citizenship-based taxation. Arguably, the
main reason for these other countries' failure to tax based on citizenship
has to do with problems of enforcement and administration, and not with
any deep-seated concerns about the justness of the practice. If one
accepts this assertion, then the lack of normative consensus on the topic
and the fact that the United States is an outlier in its practice of
citizenship-based taxation is not a cause for concern. But to dismiss all
86. To be further discussed in Part III, infra.
87. For example, through its lack of real Congressional representation, as discussed
supra note 81.
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concerns associated with the United States' citizenship-based taxation
based merely on the fact that the other countries that have tried
citizenship-based taxation have failed due to problems of enforcement
seems unreasonable. Taken by itself, without any supporting reasons,
the proposition of one country taxing a person's income without a
jurisdiction based on either source or residence appears unjust. Due to
this prima facie injustice, governments that exercise the right to tax based
on citizenship would likely alleviate controversy and increase taxpayer
morale by declaring their reasons for doing so.
In addition to the controversy surrounding the basic proposition of
citizenship-based taxation, one must remember that the relationship
between the citizen and the state has changed greatly since 1924, when
the Supreme Court put forward the inherent benefits rationale for
supporting citizenship-based taxation in Cook v. Tait. Most importantly,
the phenomenon of globalization has upended many assumptions-about
how people will live, interact with their families, and earn a living-that
would make citizenship-based taxation viable. For example, many
people now carry more than one passport. Having citizenship ties to
more than one country means that using citizenship as a proxy for
community membership becomes a tenuous exercise, as certain passports
likely represent only nominal membership to a community, while another
passport (or perhaps no passport) may give an indication of the real
community to which a specific person belongs.
A globalized, multi-citizenship world, where citizenship is no
longer a sure indicator of community membership, also serves as a
rebuttal to Professor Zelinsky's argument that citizenship is an
administrable proxy for domicile.8 8 Commentators were aware of this
issue as early as 1923, when the four economists charged with advising
the League of Nations on international taxation noted the diminished
power of both citizenship and community membership to serve as a valid
indicator of a state's jurisdiction to tax. Terming the combination of
formal and informal ties to one's community as "political allegiance,"
the economists dismissed such criteria as a basis on which to tax, and
instead focused on an individual's "economic allegiance."" Their
conclusion was that the starting-point of a modern theory of international
88.
See generallyZelinsky, supra note 23.
89.
BRUIN, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN & STAMP, REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION TO THE
FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY THE PANEL OF EXPERTS 19-20

(1923) ("In modem times, however, the force of political allegiance has been
considerably weakened. The political ties of a nonresident to the mother-country may
often be merely nominal. His life may be spent abroad, and his real interests may be
indissolubly bound up with his new home, while his loyalty to the old country may have
almost completely disappeared .

. .

. The starting-point of the modem theory must

therefore be the doctrine of economic allegiance.").
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taxation must, according to the doctrine of economic allegiance, be based
on the concepts of source and residence. Thus, even in 1923, the world's
new globalized reality seemed at odds with the very concept of
citizenship-based taxation.
Some commentators, including Professor Kirsch, have argued that
perhaps it is not a good thing that people hold more than one passport,
especially if the second (or third) one is held on a nominal basis. 90 This
argument is in effect saying that citizenship can be a good proxy for
community membership, and the real problem is that, in a wave of
enthusiasm for the prestige, convenience, or other benefit derived from
holding many passports, we have moved away from applying the concept
of citizenship with any rigor. It would therefore follow that those who
hold U.S. passports on a nominal basis and do not wish to be taxed on
their worldwide income while a nonresident should relinquish their
citizenship.
Putting aside the difficulty of relinquishing one's
citizenship, this argument has merit due to its congruence with the
rationales that Professor Kirsch puts forward in favor of citizenshipbased taxation. 91 But it is not enough for academics or policy analysts to
posit this explanation. The government itself, due to the novelty and
controversy surrounding citizenship-based taxation, ought to articulate its
reasons for supporting such a policy.
As a precedent for my recommendation that the government give
reasons for supporting citizenship-based taxation, I point to both
preambular legislative descriptions, and the guidance given by executive
departments and federal agencies. Due to the controversy surrounding
its purpose and method of operating, the Patriot Act 9 2 can serve as both a
comparator to citizenship-based taxation and an example of how the
government can be proactive in publicizing its reasons for enacting
legislation. In its preamble, the Patriot Act states that its purpose is "to
deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world,
to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes."9 3 Although I recognize that finding a suitably narrow and
laconic preamble for the Internal Revenue Code that not only states its
revenue-raising purpose, but also addresses issues concerning
citizenship-based taxation is almost certainly impossible, it is
nonetheless a point of departure for thinking about how governments
already provide the kind of guidance and clarification that I am
proposing. In addition to this preamble, executive branch departments
90.
91.
the text
92.
93.

American Citizens Abroad Global Foundation, supra note 33.
That is, the "benefits received" and "community membership" arguments. See
and accompanying references supranote 24.
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Id.
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and federal agencies also issue statements that clarify the outcomes of
For example, the Treasury's Financial Crimes
the Patriot Act.
Enforcement Network states that:
The purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act is to deter and punish
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance
law enforcement investigatory tools, and other purposes, some of
which include:
To strengthen U.S. measures to prevent, detect and prosecute
international money laundering and financing of terrorism;
To subject to special scrutiny foreign jurisdictions, foreign
financial institutions, and classes of international transactions or
types of accounts that are susceptible to criminal abuse;
To require all appropriate elements of the financial services
industry to report potential money laundering;
To strengthen measures to prevent use of the U.S. financial
system for personal gain by corrupt foreign officials and
facilitate repatriation of stolen assets to the citizens of countries
to whom such assets belong. 94
One could imagine the Treasury, which already publishes
substantial explanatory preambles for Internal Revenue Code
Regulations in its Treasury Decisions, to similarly outline the
government's position on why it continues to practice citizenship-based
taxation. To the extent that such a proposal is novel, the precedents
mentioned show that any change would be incremental.
In further support of my recommendation that the government give
reasons for supporting citizenship-based taxation, we must remember
that it is not as if politicians are loath to comment on tax matters. In the
realm of corporate taxation, a plethora of politicians are eager to have
their voices heard on the territorial versus worldwide debate.95

94. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FINCEN, USA PATRIOT Act,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/usa-patriot-act (last visited Sept.
16, 2016).
95. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Plan to Curb US. Taxation of Overseas Profit
Finds Bipartisan Support, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/07/09/business/end-to-us-taxation-of-overseas-profit-finds-bipartisan-support.html
(citing Sens. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) in their support of a
move toward a territorial system of international taxation). See generally LOUIS
EISENSTErN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (Harvard University Press 2010) (1961)
(arguing that all rationales or "ideologies" for a given tax policy are actually partisan
positions designed to benefit a particular segment of society). By inference, it seems
clear that Eisenstein is at least saying that reasons must be given when a state imposes
tax.
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Politicians are similarly eager to label taxpayers as tax dodgers when
issues like inversions and tax evasion are on the table. 96 Concerning tax
evasion, the conversation around FATCA is interesting because,
although politicians are often willing to discuss how it will impair the
ability of U.S. residents to evade tax by hiding income abroad in foreign
bank accounts, 97 they do not mention that FATCA will also greatly
increase the enforceability of citizenship-based taxation. This lack of
focus on the legislation's effect on nonresident citizens, however, can
perhaps be explained by the fact that there is no evidence that FATCA
was enacted to perfect citizenship-based taxation.9 8
Regardless of whether or not the purpose of FATCA was to bolster
citizenship-based taxation, its effect on the practice will be substantial.
To the extent that compliance with citizenship-based taxation was
previously largely unenforceable, FATCA gives the United States the
potential to find those nonresident U.S. citizens who were not complying
But although there is a general
with citizenship-based taxation.
consensus that people who deliberately evade taxes assessed in the
jurisdiction in which they reside or the jurisdiction that is the source of
their income should be punished, there is much less popular support for
taxing based on neither residence nor source, but rather on citizenship.
This lack of popular support for citizenship-based taxation is perhaps
because there is no consensus on what citizenship represents. Those who
hold many passports may consider citizenship, or at least some
citizenship in some countries, to be only nominal and representative of
nothing more than their place of birth or ethnic origin. Others may
consider citizenship to be intrinsically linked with community
membership. Still others may consider citizenship to be a mechanism
through which social contract theory can be expressed. The lack of
consensus on the actual nature of citizenship means that any tax imposed
purely on that basis, such as the taxation of nonresident citizens on their
non-U.S.-source income, would greatly benefit from an explanation of
why such a practice is valid.

96. See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook Co-founder Saverin Under Fire for
Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, http://www.washington
post.com/business/technology/facebook-co-founder-saverin-under-fire-for-renouncingus-citizenship/2012/05/17/gIQAPFCyVUstory.html (discussing Sens. Chuck Schumer
(D-N.Y.) and Bob Casey's (D-Pa.) "Ex-PATRIOT" Act bill, designed to stop the
renunciation of citizenship for tax-avoidance purposes).
97. See, e.g., Jolly, supra note 11 (discussing the remarks of Senator Max Baucus
(D-Mont.) quoted in the New York Times).
98. Rather, FATCA was a reaction to the UBS scandal. See Christians, supra note
9, at 1373-74.
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POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP-BASED TAXATION

Thus far, in this article, I have promoted the thesis that, due to
academic controversy and perceived unfairness, the U.S. government
ought to give reasons for maintaining citizenship-based taxation. In Part
II, I showed the progression of the reasons given for citizenship-based
taxation from the Civil War until Cook v. Tait. Of note is the fact that,
post-Cook v. Tate, the debate about citizenship-based taxation itself
ended. Instead, the conversation in Congress turned to fixing the
problems associated with citizenship-based taxation through patches,
instead of evaluating the substance of this method of taxation. I posited
that if the government is to rely on the Cook v. Tait inherent-benefitsreceived reasoning, then the government ought to set out which benefits
it deems to be valuable enough to justify its unique practice of
citizenship-based taxation.
In Part II, I also argued that, if the
government is going to rely on a benefits rationale to justify citizenshipbased taxation, then the only benefit that truly distinguishes U.S. citizens
and Green Card holders from those with noncitizen status is the right to
return. Although the U.S. right of return is not distinguishable on its
substantive characteristics from the right of return offered by other
countries, it is arguably more valuable due to the opportunity to
participate in U.S. societal and economic life.
In this part, I will present a case study of popular conceptions of
citizenship-based taxation in order to examine how the experience of
those actually affected by the practice aligns with my arguments, as well
as other theoretical accounts of citizenship-based taxation-in particular,
Professor Kirsch's "community membership" theory.9 9
Other
commentators, especially the National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson in
her annual reports, have done much to show the effects of citizenshipbased taxation on everyday non-resident U.S. citizens.100 In order to be
able to base my own research primarily on firsthand accounts, however, I
will rely mainly on video testimony that is available online through a
submission to the United States Senate Finance Committee International
Tax Working Group by John Richardson, a resident of Canada who has
been very active in the grassroots opposition to U.S. citizenship-based
taxation and FATCA. To broaden the scope of my inquiry, I will also
review written responses to a survey on the topic of relinquishing
99. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 24, at 479-88;
American Citizens Abroad Global Foundation, supra note 33.
100.

See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss
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(2012) (discussing the penalties flowing from noncompliance with the little-known
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts ("FBAR") form, which is an integral part
of the information-acquiring apparatus needed for the U.S. to enforce citizenship-based
taxation, and describing such penalties as disproportionate and draconian).
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citizenship by nonresident U.S. citizens conducted by Dr. Amanda
Klekowski von Koppenfels.
A.

Why We Tax

When thinking about how everyday U.S. citizens who live abroad
understand taxation, it is helpful to re-examine the premise of taxation
beginning from its fundamentals. Taxation is primarily about raising
revenue for the state.' 0' The state must raise revenue because, through its
government, it provides services. At the federal level in the United
States, such services include defensive ones, notably maintaining borders
and protecting U.S. interests through the armed forces. The state also
provides oversight services, such as federal penitentiaries to remove
known felons from the population, courts to act as a last resort when one
has been wronged, and regulatory bodies to help stop wrongs from
occurring in the first place. There are administrative services, such as the
Government Printing Office, which distributes and gives notice of the
government's activities; the IRS, which raises revenue by enforcing the
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations; and the National Park
Service, which maintains nature reserves. Finally, there are basic and
advanced infrastructure services. At the basic end of the spectrum, I
would include commonly accepted state functions such as building roads.
More advanced services include providing education, healthcare, and
some sort of a minimum living standard through unemployment
insurance, the earned income tax credit, or other similar programs.
Over time, societies have relied on different forms of taxation to
raise the revenue necessary to fund the state. 102 These forms of taxation
have included a proportionate levy on physical goods produced, such as
crops;1 03 head taxes, which require that each citizen (meaning, in this
case, each member of the community) pay a flat fee;1' tariffs on goods

101.

STEPHEN B. COHEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 11

(West Publishing, 1989) ("The primary purpose of the income tax is to pay for
government expenditures.").
102. One could argue that, in the case of ancient societies, such as the Old Kingdom
dynasties in Ancient Egypt or the Mesopotamians, a large reason for levying taxes was
not to provide services, but rather to enrich the ruling class and fund their opulent
lifestyle.

CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND

EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 65-76 (Touchstone Books, 1st ed. 1986). While
recognizing that this is true, I would add that, in addition to providing benefits for
themselves, ancient royals also had to defend their citizens when faced with a foreign
threat. They also sometimes provided minimal oversight and administrative services,
such as by dispensing justice and by regulating prices of basic food provisions. Id. at 7784.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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that cross borders as a fee for gaining access to a particular market; 0 5
and usage-based fees, such as tolls for a particular road or bridge. 1 o6
Modem societies, including the United States, also tax consumption,
such as through a sales tax or value added tax;' 0 7 real-estate holdings, in
order to fund municipal projects such as schools;os and wealth taxes. 109
In the United States, we also use income tax-that is, a tax based on
one's ability to pay-as a general-purpose revenue raiser for the federal
government.110
Once the state decides what kind of tax it wants to apply, the state
will then need to determine the tax base-that is, the class of persons on
whom the tax will be levied. When determining the base, the state must
consider issues of jurisdiction, enforceability, and administrability. If the
Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska decided that it would begin
collecting tolls from anyone who used the Brooklyn Bridge in New York
City, it would have no legal jurisdiction to do so because the bridge is
owned and operated by the New York City Department of
Transportation. In addition, the Municipality of Anchorage would also
need to have equipment and persons on site in order to administer the
tax, which would make administration difficult. Finally, it is unlikely
105.
106.

See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
The medieval-era London Bridge, for example, levied tolls on its users. See

generally TONY SHARP, THE ORIGINS OF THE BRIDGE HOUSE ESTATES AND BRIDGE HOUSE

TRUST (2009). This tradition of using tolls for particular bridges or roads is alive and
well today, to which any user of the U.S. east-coast turnpike system, the Central London
congestion charge, or any of the EU's many toll roads can attest.
107. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1105 (McKinney 2016).
108. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1302 (McKinney 2016).
109. A pure tax on wealth is generally considered difficult to administer due to
administrative and enforcement issues. COHEN, supra note 101, at 12 ("Doesn't wealth
itself provide a better measure of ability to pay for the cost of government? What are the
practical obstacles to taxing wealth?") Professor Cohen expended on this concept in the
second, draft edition (unpublished, draft on file with author). With the coming into force
of FATCA, as well as advances in accounting and actuarial sciences, one wonders if
these reasons against a wealth tax will be true in the coming decades. See Montano
Cabezas, Tax Transparency and the Marketplace: A Pathway to State Sustainability,
10:2 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 179 (2015). Also, Professor Thomas Piketty has
famously argued for a tax on wealth for global economic and equitable reasons. See
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 515-39 (Belknap Press, 3rd

ed. 2014).
The estate tax, however, especially when combined with the income tax,
arguably acts as a proxy for a pure wealth tax. See 26 U.S.C. Subtitle B (2012); Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90
VA. L. REv. 1193 (2004) (arguing that income and estate taxes were enacted partially
because of their potential to curb excessive accumulations of political, economic, and
social power by the rich). See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency,
Equity, and ProgressiveTaxation, 111 YALE L. J. 1391 (2002) (reviewing JOEL SLEMROD
(ED.), DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (2001)).

110.

26 U.S.C. Subtitle A.
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that the relevant New York state, municipal, and law enforcement
authorities would allow the Municipality of Anchorage to physically
enforce the tax, say by way of a barricade or similar device; similarly, it
is unlikely that the assertive people of New York City would submit to
being taxed by an entity that is foreign to them, to which they have no
connection beyond being part of the Union, and from which they receive
no services.111 Here, the principal issue is that the Municipality of
Anchorage has no jurisdiction. One can imagine similar challenges
regarding the implementation of a sales or consumption tax, or a property
tax, where one does not have jurisdiction or control over the market (for
example, the Municipality of Anchorage imposing taxes on those who
own real estate in New York City, or administering a five percent levy on
all sales transactions in Manhattan).
When thinking further about administrability and enforcement, it
may be useful to switch from caricature-like hypotheticals like the
Municipality of Anchorage taxing individuals in the City of New York to
the real-life practice of taxing nonresidents on their non-U.S.-source
income via citizenship-based taxation. With respect to administrability,
one must be able to obtain sufficient data to assess the tax, and must
communicate effectively with the taxpayer in a manner that would allow
the state to impose the tax in question. Prior to the introduction of
FATCA, the United States relied largely on self-reporting in order to
assess citizenship-based taxation. This is because, unless the nonresident
taxpayer worked for a U.S. government employer or some other entity
that was required to report the earnings of its employees abroad,11 2 there
was neither oversight of the nonresident's income nor any record of who
was abroad for the purposes of alerting the IRS that they should
investigate a given taxpayer. Today, however, if a nonresident U.S.
taxpayer is living in a country that has adopted FATCA 1 3 and refuses to
share personal bank information with the IRS, then that taxpayer may be
denied access to a bank account on the basis of the taxpayer's
111. Concerning the possibility of the Municipality of Anchorage providing services
to New York City, one could imagine a scenario in which the Municipality of Anchorage
did provide services directly to New York City, such as by providing satellite or
antennae-relay services to allow for faster connections to the Asian financial markets by
New York City bankers, patrolling the air space over the Northern Pacific to prohibit
Eastern-hemisphere-originating missile strikes on New York, and any other services that
the Municipality of Anchorage is uniquely poised to accomplish because of its
geographic location.
112. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 406 (2012).
113.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

LLP, FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT

(FATCA): INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT (IGA) MONITOR, http://www.pwc.com/us
/en/financial-services/publications/fatca-publications/intergovernmental-agreementsmonitor.jhtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (showing over 121 FATCA intergovernmental
agreements signed, in effect, or in advanced stages of negotiation).
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"recalcitrant. account holder" status.1 14 With respect to enforcement, the
revenue rule-that is, the common-law principle that prohibits one
country from collecting revenue on behalf of another-makes
enforcement largely impossible.' 15 Until FATCA, the only practical
recourse that the United States had against someone who owed taxes but
did not have U.S.-based assets was to deny that person a right of reentry.1 16 Although commentators have noted that, due to the IRS's lack
of resources, it may not have the capacity to effectively administer
FATCA, much less enforce it,' 17 FATCA does in some respects
circumvent the traditional limitations on enforcing tax abroad found in
the revenue rule. By greatly reducing the capacity of those who maintain
recalcitrant account holder status to access foreign bank accounts,"1
FATCA increases the hardship felt by those who do not comply with its
requirements, and thus increases the United States' capacity to enforce
citizenship-based taxation.
One could argue that the reason for the need to begin my
explanation of citizenship-based taxation with caricature-like
hypotheticals is because the taxation of nonresidents on their non-U.S.source income is a caricature-like proposition to begin with. With the
exception of citizenship-based taxation, all other taxes are levied on
some form or combination of residence, source, and situs.11 9 A toll or
tariff on goods crossing borders would be a tax based on situs; if a person
wants to move something of value across borders or use a public service,
then the thing being taxed must actually cross the border or use the
service. Consumption or sales taxes, and, usually, the income taxation of
nonresidents, is based on source; if a person is to be taxed in this manner,
the transaction must occur in or the income must arise from a market or
place within the state's jurisdiction. Head taxes and the taxation of the
income of those domiciled in a community are based on residence; a
person must actually live in the community for that person to be taxed.
114. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-1(b)(110) (as amended in 2014).
115. For further discussion of the revenue rule, see Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue
Rule: A Common Law Doctrinefor the Twenty-First Century, 16 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 79 (2006).
116. See, e.g., S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 40304 (2012). This bill would have restricted
travel by any person who owed more than $50,000 in federal taxes. The final version of
this legislation, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012), did not contain this provision. Note that, due to the lack of a
national database cataloging citizens abroad, it would be difficult for the State
Department to enforce such a travel restriction without further infrastructure
developments.
117. See generally Thomas Zehnle, Rethinking the Approach to Voluntary
Disclosures, 134 TAX NoTES 575 (Jan. 30, 2012).

118.
119.

Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 1, at 166.
See BRuIN, EINAuDI, SELIGMAN & STAMP, supra note 89, at 19-20.
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In addition, the income of residents is generally taxed on a worldwide
basis; in other words, a community will not lay a claim to the entirety of
a person's income unless the person is domiciled in that community.
Accordingly, because citizenship-based taxation is outside the sphere of
commonly accepted norms of taxation, it not unsurprising that many
intuitively view it as an aberration.
This lack of obvious reasons for taxing the non-U.S.-source income
of nonresident citizens, especially in the absence of unique benefits
offered to citizens abroad, makes it easy to see why nonresident U.S.
citizens are not only surprised by their counter-normative tax burdens,
but also find such burdens to be unfair. In the paragraphs that follow, I
will examine firsthand accounts of how American citizens who live
abroad perceive and react to citizenship-based taxation.
B.

Case Studies
1.

Video Testimony

The following review of video testimony on citizenship-based
taxation from U.S. citizens who are living in Canada is derived from
John Richardson's submission to the Senate Finance Committee
International Tax Working Group. 120 I recognize that any small-scale
sample group, such as the one that I am proposing to use for this case
study, is flawed not only due to the participants' self-selecting nature and
inherent bias, but also because the sample group lacks diversity. That
said, using U.S. citizens residing in Canada as a comparator is not
without merit. Like the United States, Canada is a high-tax country, and
the two share many cultural and lifestyle attributes. Such similarities
reduce the chance of a person's thoughts on citizen-based taxation being
distorted by culture shock or unfamiliarity with Western norms. In
addition, Canada is the United States' most important trading partner,121
and it is the country with the second-largest population of U.S.
expatriates. 12 2 Finally, the Richardson testimonial compilation is a
120.

Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance Committee

International Tax Working Group, supra note 27. The videos themselves can be
For
accessed directly at https://vimeopro.com/citizenshiptaxation/video-testimonials.
more on Mr. Richardson, see his personal website at http://citizenshipsolutions.ca.
121. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Foreign Trade: Top TradingPartners-December2013,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/topl312yr.html.
122.
MIGRATION POLICY INST., International Migrant Population by Country of
Origin and Destination, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/inter
national-migrant-population-country-origin-and-destination (last visited June 18, 2016).
According to working group submissions, there are currently 7.6 million American
citizens living outside of the United States. UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, THE INTERNATIONAL TAX BIPARTISAN TAX WORKING GROUP REPORT 80-81
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unique source because it is, to the best of my knowledge, the only similar
collection of testimony on the matter of citizenship-based taxation. The
cases of individual nonresident U.S. citizens are set out below.
i.

Ruth: Paying Taxes in Return for Government Services

23

Ruth characterizes herself as a patriotic American, and felt that
living abroad increased her identification with being a U.S. citizen. She
believes that it is her duty as a citizen to give back to her country, and
regularly flew to the United States to volunteer, including a trip to
Oklahoma City in order to help after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building. With respect to taxation, Ruth is happy to pay
Canadian taxes. She feels that doing so is fair because Canada is where
she receives government services. Ruth knew about her obligation to file
U.S. taxes, but would not always do so because, after consulting with the
IRS, she was told that she did not meet the threshold necessary to file.
When Ruth first heard about FATCA, she thought that it was a great idea
to the extent that the legislation would help stop tax evasion. But she
became upset when her husband, a Canadian with no U.S. tax status,
started receiving negative treatment from banks due to Ruth's U.S. tax
status. For example, Ruth had offers of favorable mortgage rates
rescinded after her bank found out about her U.S. tax obligations under
FATCA. 124 As the IRS and other government actors began discussing
FATCA, Ruth felt that the perception of those making and enforcing
U.S. legislation was that if she did not like FATCA, it was because she
was a criminal. Ruth also noted that when individuals who were
arguably improperly affected by FATCA made their position known, the

-

(July 2015) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TAx BIPARTISAN REPORT]. Mexico is currently
the country that has the highest population of American emigrants.
During the Vietnam War, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 Americans fled the
United States to avoid the military draft operated by the Selective Service System. JOHN
HAGAN, NORTHERN PASSAGE: AMERICAN VIETNAM WAR RESISTERS IN CANADA 3 (2001).
If we assume that, but for the Vietnam War, none of those draft dodgers would have left
the United States, then Canada's claim to having the second highest number of U.S.
emigrants would likely be affected. It is possible that, without the U.S. draft dodgers, the
Philippines, and perhaps Israel, would have a higher number of U.S. emigrants than
Canada does.
123. Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance Committee
InternationalTax Working Group, supra note 27.
124. Note that the FATCA regulations prohibit discrimination based on U.S. status
by foreign financial entities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(f)(1)(i)(A)(9) (as amended in
2014). Most IGAs further include anti-discrimination clauses. Canada, interestingly,
does not include such a clause in its IGA. For more on this issue, see Yvonne Woldeab,
Comment, "Americans: We Love You, But We Can't Afford You ": How the Costly U.S.
Canada FATCA Agreement Permits Discrimination of Americans in Violation of
InternationalLaw, 30 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 611 (2015).
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IRS simply released more statements to the press, which gave the
impression that she was a criminal for not complying. 125 Ruth eventually
gave up her citizenship. She was upset that she was forced to choose
between the wellbeing of her family in Canada and her allegiance with
the United States, her country of birth. 12 6
ii.

Barbara: Treated Like a Criminal1 2 7

Barbara assumed that she would lose her American citizenship after
taking Canadian citizenship, and did not know that a formal renunciation
was required. In an effort to become compliant, Barbara participated in
the offshore voluntary disclosure program, an amnesty program. While
going through the voluntary disclosure process, she found that the IRS
was very unhelpful to her accountant with respect to how to become
compliant, and was shocked and embarrassed when letters from the IRS
had "CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION" in bold red letters printed on the
envelope. The characterization of Barbara as a criminal by the IRS was
too much for her to bear, and she eventually renounced her citizenship.

125. "Of the 347 submissions made to the international working group, nearly
three-quarters dealt with the international taxation of individuals, mainly
focusing on citizenship-based taxation, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA), and the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts
(FBAR). While the co-chairs were not able to produce a comprehensive plan to
overhaul the taxation of individual Americans living overseas within the timeconstraints placed on the working group, the co-chairs urge the Chairman and
Ranking Member to carefully consider the concerns articulated in the
submissions moving forward." INTERNATIONAL TAX BIPARTISAN REPORT,
supra note 188, at 80-81.
A similar reluctance to engage with FATCA issues also exists abroad. One
person, who from contextual inference seems to be a resident of Israel, noted: "I am a
U.S. citizen. I had an account at the Bank Leumi so I could buy and hold Israeli stock.
The bank made me close the account because the American demands for paperwork was
too much for them. I had under $50,000, too little for the trouble. Even my MP, who I
have discussed this with, doesn't get it. His comments could be summed up as 'They'll
likely never find you."' Michael Phillips, Comment to Taxed Into Renouncing Their US
Citizenship?, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.timesofisrael
.com/taxed-into-renouncing-their-us-citizenship/.
126. Ruth also feels betrayed by Canada, and believes that she ought to be protected
from this kind of discrimination under Canada's privacy laws and its Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.
127. Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance Committee
InternationalTax Working Group, supra note 27.
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iii. Mike's Wife: No Connection to the U.S. and Unaware of Tax
Obligations1 28
Mike is the husband of a woman who has U.S. tax status. I have
inferred that Mike is speaking on his wife's behalf because she is afraid
of being identified by the IRS. Mike's wife was born in the U.S., but,
according to him, she did not know that she likely had U.S. tax status
until recently. Mike's wife believes that, because the United States is a
foreign country, it is not fair that she should be obliged to report to a
state with which she has no connection except the fact that she was born
there. Mike explained that, in his wife's case, saying that she was
noncompliant and would owe penalties for not filing was like being fined
for failing to stop when there was no stop sign present. He feels that it is
"inhumane" for a country to levy taxes when a person has left and does
not come back.
iv.

Peter: U.S. Citizenship as a Liabilityl 29

Peter lived in Canada for seventeen years as a U.S. citizen before he
relinquished his citizenship. Although he was compliant for his first ten
years as a nonresident, Peter lapsed because of his resentment that he had
to pay taxes to a country in which he had not lived and whose public
services he had not used for over ten years. Peter made the decision to
relinquish his citizenship because he feared that he could become a
covered expatriate and would then have to pay an effective exit tax
should he wish to relinquish at a later date.1 3 0 Peter noted that he was not
given credit for non-income taxes, such as Canada's national sales tax,
on his U.S. tax return. He also disliked that some of his Canadian
government-sponsored savings plans were not given similar beneficial
treatment by the United States, especially since devices like the Roth
IRA were not available to nonresident citizens. 13 1 Peter believes that
citizenship is a liability for a U.S. citizen living abroad, and felt that a
great burden had been lifted from him when he relinquished it.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Cf I.R.C. § 877 (2012) (treating relinquishment of citizenship or Green Card
status as realization event for tax purposes for citizens and long-term (eight years or
more) Green Card holders who exceed income or wealth thresholds).
131. See the discussion supra at note 28.
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Katie: Turned Against the U.S.1 3 2

Katie came to Canada from the U.S. as a preschooler. She retained
U.S. tax status and did not agree with citizenship-based taxation, so she
relinquished her citizenship. Katie no longer has any goodwill for her
country of birth, and considers citizenship-based taxation to be a human
rights violation.
vi. Linda: Cannot Afford to Become Compliant; Cannot Afford
to Relinquish Citizenship1 33
Linda is a homemaker who does not want to pay compliance costs
to simply tell the U.S. that she does not owe any money. She feels that
paying taxes in Canada, the country where she consumes public goods
and which she calls home, ought to be enough. In particular, Linda was
upset that her Canadian mutual funds were treated as passive foreign
investment companies ("PFICs"),13 4 and said that it would cost $134,000,
more than twice her annual income, to become compliant, which is a
prerequisite to relinquishing her U.S. citizenship. Because of the high
cost of relinquishing, she is effectively trapped in her U.S. citizenship.
vii. Marilyn: Cannot Afford to Remain a U.S. Citizenl 35
Marilyn, a U.S.-trained lawyer who taught law at a Canadian
University was a proud American. When she was required to take
Canadian citizenship to be admitted to practice law in Ontario,1 36
Marilyn filed an affidavit with the U.S. consulate in Toronto stating that
she was not taking a repudiatory step by accepting another citizenship
and explained that the second citizenship was required for professional
reasons. What ultimately moved Marilyn to relinquish her citizenship
was the fact that she could not own Canadian mutual funds without filing
the relevant PFIC forms, which, by the IRS's own estimation, requires
approximately 41 hours of work. 137 Marilyn was shocked that the United
States would consider her Canadian mutual investment to be a foreign

132. Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance Committee
InternationalTax Working Group, supra note 27.
133. Id.
134. See the discussion supra at note 28.
135. Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance Committee
InternationalTax Working Group, supra note 27.
136. Note that one need no longer obtain Canadian citizenship to practice law in
Canada. See generally Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
137.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8621, at 14 (2014).
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fund, as she was both domiciled and resident in Canada.1 38 Ultimately,
Marilyn could not afford to remain a U.S. citizen, as the cost of
compliance-including accounting fees and U.S. taxes (which would
include a higher tax rate on Marilyn's Canadian mutual funds due to their
PFIC status)-would have cost her and her husband more than $125,000
of their retirement money over the next 15 to 20 years.'
This
discriminatory treatment made Marilyn feel like U.S. citizens living
abroad were treated as second-class citizens. Marilyn also noted the
chance nature of her awareness of Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts ("FBAR") and PFIC filing obligations, and said that if she had
not read about them in a seniors' magazine, she would have been
ignorant of them. Marilyn is "bitter and angry" that the United States,
the country in which her family has lived since before the Civil War, "is
treating its own citizens abroad like criminals and tax cheats, and making
their lives miserable because of an unfair tax regime."l40
2.

Survey

Another tool that is useful to gauge popular reactions to citizenshipbased taxation is the survey conducted by Dr. Amanda Klekowski von
Koppenfels, of the University of Kent.1 4 1 Dr. von Koppenfels's research
surveyed 1,404 U.S. citizens and 142 former citizens living outside of the
United States in December 2014 and January 2015. Dr. von Koppenfels
describes her work as an "an opt-in snowball survey, distributed initially
via overseas American organizations. The survey included closed-ended
and open-ended questions, allowing for both quantitative and qualitative
analysis." 42

138.

Marilyn also mentioned that, even if she wanted to purchase U.S. mutual funds,

she could not because her Canadian broker was prohibited from selling her such
investments.
See Video Testimony Prepared for Submission to Senate Finance
Committee InternationalTax Working Group, supra note 27.

139. Richardson, supra note 27. Note that, with the American dollar getting stronger
and the steady weakening of the Canadian dollar due to falling oil prices, the cost of
becoming compliant would almost certainly be even more expensive today and in the
future.
140. Id Marilyn goes on to say that she believes that her "earliest known American
ancestor, who settled in Bowling Green, Kentucky in 1848, would understand [her]
predicament." A version of Marilyn's story, in the form of a letter to President Barack
Obama was published by Forbes magazine in 2014. See Dear Mr. President, Why I'm
Leaving America, FORBES, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014
/08/15/dear-mr-president-why-im-leaving-america/.
141.
AMANDA KLEKOWSKI VON KOPPENFELS, SURVEY OF CITIZENSHIP RENUNCIATION
INTENTIONS AMONG US CITIZENS ABROAD (2015), http://www.kent.ac.uk/brussels/docu

ments/kvksurveyresults.pdf.
142. Id. at 1.
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Among her main findings, Dr. von Koppenfels notes that
compliance and accounting costs were totally out of proportion with the
amount of tax actually owed to the United States.
One survey
respondent did not want to "pay an accountant 2000E in order to pay the
USA $0.00 in the end."1 43 Another respondent said that remaining
compliant would require the payment of nearly ten percent of the
respondent's annual income in accounting and administrative fees.'" It
seems reasonable to assume that some of these high accounting fees are
due to the fact that mutual funds, as well as other government-sponsored
savings programs, such as retirement and education savings accounts, are
generally deemed to be PFICs unless there is an exemption in that
particular country's tax treaty. 14 5
Another recurring theme is the fact that filing FBARs with the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") made the
respondents feels like criminals. This is consistent with the sentiment
expressed in the video testimonies of Barbara and Ruth, discussed above.
The survey respondents also commented on the punitive nature of the
FBAR non-filing penalties, and felt that they were akin to criminal
sanctions. Perhaps the most well-known example of excessive FBAR
penalties is the case of Patricia Anderson d'Addario, whose $80,000
FBAR penalty was imposed despite the fact that Ms. Anderson
d'Addario was compliant with her IRS forms.146
The concerns about additional costs under FBAR were also true
under FATCA, except that, in addition to increased compliance costs,
respondents noted difficulties in maintaining or opening bank and
investment accounts, as well as in securing mortgages.1 4 7 While almost
all FATCA IGAs have clear anti-discrimination provisions,1 4 8 in practice,
this simply means that institutions cannot merely point to the IGA in
order to justify their position. The discriminating institution must then
make a modicum of effort in order to find another way to refuse to
provide a given service. To the extent that such covert discriminatory

143. Id. at 2.
144. Id. ("To maintain tax compliancy with my pension account I was going to have
to pay my accountant at least E1500 per year and I only earn £18 to E20,000 per year.").
145. See the discussion supra at note 28.
146. Letter from Patricia M. Anderson d'Addario to the United States Senate
Committee on Finance (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.finance.senate.gov/legislation
/download/?id=862e6322-f9fl-4852-9e72-82d24ae25ccb. The arguably disproportionate
penalization of those who do not file FBARs has been noted by U.S. National Taxpayer
Advocate Nina Olson. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
79-94 (2014). On the other hand, however, if one is going to administer an anti-fraud
program, it makes sense to have substantial penalties in order to induce compliance.
147. VoN KOPPENFELS, supra note 141, at 2.
148. See the discussion supra note 124.
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practices exist, they remind one of the tacit redlining and other
institutional discrimination that still occurs today. 149
An additional issue related to bank discrimination that also caused
hardship for the survey participants was the effects of one spouse's U.S.tax status in mixed-nationality marriages. Foreign financial institutions
are required not only to report the account information of those with U.S.
tax status, but also of those whose spouses have U.S. status. 150
Anecdotal evidence shows that banks may additionally impose their own
restrictions such as the closing of joint accounts, exclusion from family
trusts, and forced reorganization of financial affairs.15 1 The survey notes
that the deleterious effects on the affected mixed-nationality marriages
are generally much worse when one spouse does not earn income. This
situation echoes the sentiment expressed in Ruth's video testimony,
above, when she noted that she felt like she had to choose between her
non-U.S. family and her country of birth.
For those who wish to give up their citizenship, including accidental
and unknowing Americans, there was a feeling among some respondents
that the media was portraying the administrative aspects of the citizenship
relinquishment process as much easier than they actually were, and
characterized having U.S. citizenship akin to "being in a cage." 152 For
example, from a financial perspective, as discussed by Peter in his video
testimony, if persons are deemed to be "covered expatriates," they could
face a significant tax payment should they choose to relinquish. Note that
in order to relinquish, one must also be compliant for the five years prior
to the date that citizenship would end. 15 3 Becoming compliant could
entail FBAR penalties, as well as significant accounting fees if the
relinquisher holds accounts deemed to be PFICs. Similarly, from an
administrative perspective, the delay in processing can be onerous. As
discussed in Marilyn's video testimony, she decided to relinquish in

&

149. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Human Dev., HUD
Associated Bank Reach Historic $200 Million Settlement of 'Redlining' Claim (May 26,
2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/pressreleasesmediaadvisories
/2015/HUDNo_15-064b. For another example of tacit discrimination, see, e.g., Leon
Neyfakh & Aaron Wolfe, Why PoliceAre So Violent Toward Black Men, SLATE, Aug. 6,
2015, http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand_politics/crime/2015/08/baltimoreex-cop
discusses_policeviolence toward-youngblackmen .html.
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-1(b) (as amended in 2014).
151. Viginia La Torre Jeker, Thank You, FA TCA, You've Just Busted My Marriage,
ANGLOINFO: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, DUBAI (Sept. 19, 2014), http://blogs.angloinfo.
com/us-tax/2014/09/19/thank-you-fatca-youve-just-busted-my-marriage/.
See generally
DEMOCRATS ABROAD, FATCA: AFFECTING EVERYDAY AMERICANs EVERY DAY (2014),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Att/ 0 202%20Democrats%20Abroad%202
014%20FATCA%20Research%20Reportl.pdf.
152. VON KOPPENFELS, supra note 141, at 3.
153. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (2012).
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Quebec because the wait time was over one year in Toronto, the city with
the nearest U.S. consulate.
Finally, the respondents expressed a sense of "being targeted,"
noting that they had to combat the widespread attitude that those living
outside the U.S. are tax cheats. One respondent was tired of being treated
like a criminal merely because the respondent was an expatriate, and
would not have relinquished U.S. citizenship had the United States treated
the respondent with respect. Another respondent felt angered that the
treatment of a nonresident U.S. citizen as a suspected criminal extended to
one's family "all because one family member is American who dared to
marry abroad." 15 4 This treatment is compounded with frustration over a
lack of dedicated political representation for Americans abroad, such that
the U.S. system feels like "[d]ouble taxation without representation,
without services, but with onerous 'Orwellian' compliance." 55
C.

Commentary

The sentiments expressed in both the video testimonials and the
survey support the assertions made by Nina Olson, the National
Taxpayer Advocate, concerning the perception of those affected by
citizenship-based taxation to the effect that its administration and
enforcement are "scary," "disproportionate," and "excessive to the point
of possibly violating the U.S. Constitution." 5 6 Such a uniformly poor
perception is perhaps to be expected from a self-selecting group of
respondents. Those who are indifferent to, or who perhaps accept,
citizenship-based taxation, would be much less motivated to participate
in the testimonial or survey when compared to someone who is either
extremely enthusiastic about the concept or loathes the very idea of
taxing based on citizenship. That said, the responses, especially the
video testimonials, are not uniform. With some participants, one feels as
though they have truly been wronged. But with others, one wonders if
the "love it or leave it" motto would be appropriate.
With respect to those who have been wronged, one can easily think
of Ruth, who legitimately seems to have been forced to choose between
her family in Canada and allegiance with the United States. Barbara as
well seems to have objectively valid reasons for feeling humiliated and
worn down by the IRS characterizations of her actions, which consisted
of nothing more than living an ordinary life outside of the United States,
as criminal. On the other hand, with respect to Peter, who chose to
relinquish his citizenship for purely economic reasons, one struggles to
154.

VoN KOPPENFELS, supra note 141, at 3.

155.

Id.

156.

NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 147 (2012).
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feel the kind of empathy that is elicited when Ruth and Barbara tell their
stories. In fact, Peter's actions seem to be a perfect example of the lack
of community membership posited by Professor Kirsch, and thus his
relinquishing of American citizenship could arguably be a good thing.
For the moment, I will set aside this type of case. Instead I will focus on
the three recurring problems discussed in the video testimonials and
surveys; namely, the problem of burdening accidental Americans with
citizenship-based taxation, the high compliance costs of citizenshipbased taxation, and the lack of benefits provided to those on whom
citizenship-based taxation is imposed.
Concerning accidental Americans (or perhaps more accurately
"unknowing" Americans), the case of Mike's wife seems to be the
paradigmatic example of a person who is burdened with U.S. tax
obligations but who has no community connection to the United States
beyond the fact that she was born there. But there are other, perhaps
thornier, issues at play, such as whether an accidental Americans should
be excused from citizenship-based taxation if they occasionally visit
family in the United States. The real problem here, however, seems to be
a conflation of citizenship and domicile, which makes Professor
Zelinsky's proposal of using citizenship as a proxy for domicile
problematic. 1 7 The best solution to the problem seems to be the samecountry exception recommendation by Professor Allison Christians,
which would eliminate the application of citizenship-based taxation on
income that arose in the jurisdiction in which a person is resident or
domiciled.15 8
The Obama administration has also signaled their
awareness of this issue, and has proposed measures to facilitate the
relinquishment of American citizenship by accidental Americans, thus
easing some of the burden of citizenship-based taxation."9 In short, the
plight of accidental Americans is clearly unjust, and whether or not
citizenship-based taxation is maintained, this issue must be addressed.
The issues associated with the high costs of compliance have been
discussed earlier in this article, but their frequent repetition in the video
testimonials and survey results seem to validate being concerned about
them. We are reminded of Linda, the person who would like to give up
citizenship but cannot afford to do so because the United States treats her
Canadian mutual funds as foreign, which makes them subject to the PFIC
regime. We are also reminded of Marilyn, who similarly could not
157.

See generally Zelinsky, supra note 23.

158.
See generally Allison Christians, Could a Same-Country Exception Help Focus
FATCA andFBAR?, 67 TAX NOTES INT'L 157 (2012).
159.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S

FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 282-83

(2015), https://www.treasury.gov

/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf
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afford to keep her U.S. citizenship because of the high PFIC-related
compliance costs associated with her Canadian mutual funds. Clearly, it
is wrong that people have to spend thousands of dollars simply to tell the
United States that they owe nothing in taxes. Additionally, Americans
living abroad should ideally face U.S. tax obligations that are no greater
than those of their U.S.-resident fellow citizens. The simplification of
reporting requirements is the most obvious solution. Part of the problem
seems to be that all Americans living abroad are forced to file FBAR
forms, which are designed to impair money laundering (and accordingly
have unusually steep penalty fees for noncompliance), as opposed to
enhancing the revenue-collecting capacity of the individual income tax
regime. Additionally, the characterization of a person's home country
investments as PFICs seems unreasonable-especially from the
taxpayer's perspective. No doubt many nonresident citizens are aghast
to find out that their home country's retirement saving plan is a "foreign"
account. Again, as Professor Christians recommends, 16 0 a same-country
exception would be a simple way to eliminate many of the problems,
including high compliance costs, associated with citizenship-based
taxation, while still maintaining the integrity of the system.
The final recurring issue is the lack of social services received by
U.S. citizens living abroad. While it is true that some nonresident
Americans in certain countries may continue to maintain some social
security benefits after moving abroad, 16 1 this must be distinguished from
the true lack of everyday benefits referred to in the video testimony and
survey. As discussed in Part II, above, and more specifically as rebutted
by Professor Mason, 16 2 the proposition put forward by Cook v. Tait, that
Americans benefit inherently from the U.S. government while abroad,
has little basis in reality. There is no real solution to this issue, and the
U.S. government should therefore clarify why it is imposing citizenshipbased taxation in the first place.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. government has not commented on the rationale for
citizenship-based taxation since Cook v. Tait was decided in 1924. The
world has changed significantly since that time. We now live in a
globalized society and people are moving abroad more than ever. While
there is an active conversation about citizenship-based taxation, it is not

160.
See generally Christians,supra note 158.
161.
See the description of social security totalization agreements at International
Agreements, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/international/totalizationagreements

.html (last visited June 18, 2016).
162. See generallyMason, supra note 21.
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happening in the political sphere. Instead, this conversation is happening
quietly among friends in the homes of expatriates and in the academic
community. This ought to change, and the debate should be taken into
the legislature. The taxes imposed on nonresident citizens are perceived
as being counter-normative and counter-intuitive, and those paying taxes
have a right to know why they are paying. If the U.S. government
intends to rely on the benefits rationale, then that reliance should be
reaffirmed. It seems unreasonable to tacitly rely on a disputed precedent
that is almost 100 years old.
Although the prospect of the government giving explanatory
reasons for the laws that it enacts may seem novel, the legislature, the
executive branch, and administrative agencies often give guidance for the
rationales behind statutes in preambles and other supplementary texts,
and any difference between these precedents and what I am proposing
would thus be incremental. Further, politicians are often eager to give
their opinions on the policy behind laws and regulations. Because of the
academic controversy and perceived unfairness surrounding citizenshipbased taxation, it seems ideally placed to receive additional
governmental guidance with respect to its rationale. My analysis shows
that the rationale for citizenship-based taxation set out in Cook v. Tait is
wrong to the extent that it suggests that the citizen benefits inherently
from the government in a manner that justifies taxation. But the
Supreme Court was right to the extent it held that the only way a
government could rationally tax the non-U.S.-source income of a citizen
living abroad was if that government conferred a benefit on the person
being taxed.
If there is a benefit being conferred on nonresident U.S. citizens, it
is the benefit of a right to return. This right of return is not in substance
different from the right of return offered by other countries, but it is
arguably more valuable, and thus could potentially justify citizenshipbased taxation. By not articulating this position, however, the U.S.
government is contributing to poor political discourse. Congress should
remedy this situation, and set out the grounds for its decision to tax
citizens abroad. It follows that if the U.S. government feels that it cannot
justify citizenship-based taxation, then it should be abolished.

